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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Commission launched an issues paper / questionnaire on 15 December 2006 as 
the start of a process leading to the adoption of a Communication on a "European 
Consensus on Humanitarian Aid".  
In order to provide practical examples of the issues raised in the questionnaire, this 
paper provides an overview of experiences drawn from responses to four crises: the 
DRC; Lebanon; Pakistan and Burma/Myanmar.  
Section two provides an overview of the issues and highlights specific experiences 
and conclusions that emerged. Section three to six contain the detailed descriptions 
of the contexts of and responses to these crises. Annex I provides a chronology of the 
crises and annex II an overview of funding decisions per country concerned. 
2. OVERVIEW OF ISSUES RAISED  
2.1. Upholding the Principles of Humanitarian Aid 
The humanitarian space is put under pressure. Humanitarian actors need to be 
creative to ensure access to and protection of the humanitarian space and vulnerable 
groups. Funding for forgotten crises is part of the upholding of the principles, 
underpinning EU humanitarian aid.  
In all cases, access to and security in crisis areas was an issue that obstructed the 
impact of the humanitarian aid. Lack of access and security not only affects the 
capacity to respond, it also makes it more difficult to find qualified (local and 
international) staff, as was the case in the DRC. Sometimes innovative approaches 
are needed: for instance, in the context of the Lebanon conflict, the deployment of a 
civil-military liaison officer to Tel Aviv to “liaise” with one of the parties to the 
conflict was the first experience of its kind. It was positive, as it not only improved 
the security management for the Commission itself, but also allowed DG ECHO to 
advocate in favour of secure access for its partners. In Pakistan, upholding the 
principles was easier during the emergency phase, when needs were highest. In the 
following recovery phase, actors were less unified. Tension related to the 'Danish 
cartoons' issue made the fragility of the humanitarian space apparent: it caused a 
series of security incidents with hostility from certain political and religious sectors 
of local society manifested towards the aid workers. In Burma/Myanmar, safety of 
local staff is promoted by the insistence of a presence of expatriate staff in the 
supported projects. Public and political interest in humanitarian crises often plays a 
controversial role regarding principles. This role needs to be managed properly: 
when attention is missing, such as is the case for Burma/Myanmar, donors need to 
ensure availability of funding. When there is a lot of political interest – as was the 
case in Lebanon - donors need to manage the challenge of upholding the principles. 
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2.2. Advocating the Respect for International Humanitarian Law  
The EU forcefully advocated the respect for IHL through direct (letters, Council 
resolutions) and indirect actions (via partners). Even if there is a strong political 
stance vis-à-vis a government, it is still possible to provide humanitarian aid.  
Strong advocacy is evidenced in many crises: In Lebanon, The EU made repeated 
calls for all parties to respect IHL, notably the protection of civilian populations and 
the facilitation of access to the victims. The visibility of the Lebanese conflict 
constituted an excellent opportunity to seize political and public interest in order to 
promote the principles of humanitarian aid and to push for respect of humanitarian 
space. The recurrent reference to the situation in the Palestinian territories in 
Commissioner Michel's interventions on Lebanon, in the Council Conclusions and 
the constant references to IHL were examples of a positive use of media and political 
interest. 
With regards to Burma/Myanmar, the EU Common Position refers to restrictive 
measures vis-à-vis the government and to the assistance approach. These restrictive 
measures have been in place since 1996. The Common Position, extended in April 
2007 for another year, refers to dialogue with the regime ("... engage with the 
government over its responsibility to make greater efforts to attain the UN 
Millennium Development Goals"). It mandates assistance, focusing on health and 
education, to be delivered through UN agencies or international NGOs. It allows 
only for programmes that emphasise advocacy for humanitarian principles and 
human rights and limits aid to humanitarian aid. Such aid is for instance provided to 
the ICRC and UNHCR, who dialogue with the military government for respect to 
minorities and IHL. The political dimension of the Common Position is highlighted 
by a number of EU statements (Presidency and Council Conclusion), e.g. when the 
ICRC was under increased government pressure and considering withdrawing from 
the country,, because they could not perform their protection mandate due to the 
obstacles created by the authorities. The EU intervention helped to oblige the 
government to change its position and was accompanied by continued financial 
support to ICRC activities, providing direct and indirect actions in terms of 
advocacy. 
2.3. Emergency Response Policy  
The deployment of DG ECHO experts allows for quick responses fulfilling several 
roles in terms of coordination and needs assessment. Redeploying of Headquarters 
staff proved successful to increase rapid response capabilities. 
DG ECHO's presence in affected areas through its field experts before emergencies 
had facilitated fast delivery when needed. It also helped to respond in a context-
specific manner, as was the case in DRC. In Pakistan, mobile (DG ECHO) teams 
were deployed to rapidly report back on needs and to advise on partner presence and 
performance for funding allocations. These teams took on coordination work to 
ensure quality of responses. Also in other crises, DG ECHO's presence provided for 
both quality by facilitating proper needs assessments and coordination, as well as 
speed thanks to its direct presence. However, access to the affected population as 
well as the scale of the needs provided challenges. In Pakistan, the huge impact of 
the crisis brought major difficulties in terms of logistics. Speed of delivery and 
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quantity of supply were real challenges. Overall, logistical capacity should be 
increased and more specifically, DG ECHO's role in ensuring availability and speed 
by better coordination and stronger field presence. The example of Lebanon could be 
followed, where a redeployment of staff at headquarters and field level took place 
and where the EC Delegation fulfilled a crucial role in coordinating efforts.  
2.4. Scope of Humanitarian Aid in Relation to Crisis Management and ESDP  
In the context of the Lebanon conflict, the interface with the European military at 
headquarters level was important for the adequacy of the military assets used in 
support of the humanitarian intervention as well as for guaranteeing access. On the 
ground, the interface with the Israeli military, through the deployment of a DG 
ECHO's liaison officer to Tel Aviv was very functional in guaranteeing safe access. 
In DRC, DG ECHO initiated a liaison mechanism following MCDA guidelines. This 
helped to respect the mandates and roles of humanitarian operators and military to be 
fully respected, including the different visual identities. It also ensured that the 
military were not directly involved in humanitarian activities, but created the 
environment for others to do so. In Pakistan, DG ECHO supported the United 
Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) - a successful civil-military logistics 
operation coordinated with the government..  
2.5. Scope of Humanitarian Aid in Relation to Disaster Reduction and Transitional 
Contexts  
Disaster Reduction and LRRD should be taken into consideration and mainstreamed 
at the start of any intervention and preferably guided by policies and funding. 
Follow-up funding needs to be made available by donors.  
Humanitarian aid is one component in a multi-pronged approach which can be very 
expensive and human-resource consuming as all the components need to be put in 
place simultaneously. There is a need to start thinking about LRRD already when 
planning humanitarian interventions to be successful. By doing so, many of the 
humanitarian programmes can be successfully taken over by other partners as is done 
in DRC. In Lebanon, following the emergency, plans for 'return to normality' have 
been integrated and funding is needed for transition from emergency to development. 
This is especially the case for livelihood-recovery (transition) and de-mining 
(LRRD). Pakistan showed a successful follow-up of interventions by DG RELEX 
who had allocated € 50M for rehabilitation assistance and early recovery within two 
months. Disaster Reduction and Mitigation in Pakistan were further mainstreamed in 
the funding response, by providing adequate knowledge and information material on 
seismic safety to local governments, communities and schools. Strong ownership of 
the Government of Pakistan, supported by the EU, the Commission and UNOCHA 
was a key success factor. A structure was set up at field level to investigate the 
needs.  
2.6. Partnership and Professionalism 
The diversity of partners contributed to effective responses as DG ECHO had 
partners on the ground in emergencies who worked with local partners. Local 
capacities can be built through various actions. Funding for capacity building 
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(thematic funding) and the availability of appropriately trained staff are crucial in 
this.  
Working with a diversity of partners enables DG ECHO to support different 
technical and geographical areas.. It also enables to provide an integrated multi-
sector assistance package to vulnerable groups. Partners in DRC work with local 
partners and provide capacity building wherever possible. In Pakistan, in addition to 
direct operational funding in response to the crisis, a number of UN agencies were 
already receiving thematic funding to improve their capacity to respond to just such a 
crisis. This was notably the case with UNOCHA, and WHO. Pro-activity towards the 
UN at head office level would help in ensuring the timely arrival of quality 
proposals. Besides capacity building through 'natural' partners, the situation of 
Burma/Myanmar provides a good example of reinforcing capacities of local NGOs 
through partnership relations with international organisations, supported by the 
Commission.  
2.7. Direct and Indirect Aid Delivery  
Existing direct aid delivery is crucial and should be strengthened, not expanded. DG 
ECHO field presence ensures rapid responses and coordination. ECHO flight 
facilitates access and logistics.  
Earlier recommendations were made that DG ECHO should ensure faster and more 
flexible redeployment of staff, especially at headquarters, to ensure available 
capacity at the right place. Following these, the Lebanon team was successfully and 
on time reinforced during the crisis. In Pakistan, the DG ECHO field team was well-
prepared as it included staff that had undergone the United Nations Disaster 
Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) training1. Also in many other emergency 
contexts, DG ECHO was already present following previous interventions. This 
greatly facilitated the response in Lebanon, where field and regional expert were in a 
position to undertake immediate needs assessments as well as ensure proper 
monitoring of activities. One of the lessons learned from the Tsunami humanitarian 
response applied in Pakistan and Lebanon was to deploy teams with at least two 
members: experience shows that one will be absorbed by coordination meetings and 
reporting tasks, freeing the other to conduct needs assessment, discuss and appraise 
project proposals with partners and monitor implementation. Continuation of 
responses and needs is ensured by presence: in Lebanon, it was decided to establish a 
more permanent team of experts and in Burma/Myanmar, a DG ECHO office was 
recently set up to ensure better monitoring and follow-up of operations. This also 
facilitates problem solving regarding access of partners and contacts with the 
Burmese authorities. Apart from presence, logistics are in many emergencies 
considered complicated and expensive, though crucial for delivery. In DRC, the 
ECHO flight support provided – at no cost - access for humanitarian actors to areas 
otherwise inaccessible. In Pakistan, DG ECHO funded Atlas Logistics which was 
very successful in rationalising airport clearance and land transport for aid partners. 
This greatly benefited effectiveness and cost efficiency of partners' aid delivery.  
                                                 
1 Training is designed to enhance coordination between UN and other agencies during the vital first phase 
of emergency response. 
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2.8. Contributing to Strengthening of the International Humanitarian System 
Implementing the cluster approach has so far only partially been successful. It 
increased the need for capacity and should focus more on the inclusion of partners. 
As responses necessitated the usage of the emergency fund, there is an apparent need 
for more EU humanitarian aid funding.  
Pakistan was the first occasion that the cluster approach was applied. Many agencies, 
including cluster leads, had to learn about and develop the new approach at the same 
time as managing their emergency responses. This led to delays. To get presence for 
all cluster leads in the field hubs took a lot of time and there was confusion over the 
leadership of the key 'shelter' cluster. At the same time, implementation was 
constrained by the shortage of experienced staff due to other disasters like Tsunami 
and Darfur. Following the cluster appeal, it still took time to bring proposals up to an 
acceptable quality, despite good field coordination. Communication problems existed 
between field hubs and Islamabad coordination. This sometimes led to 
misinformation about the real needs. However, the major donors with field presence 
worked to assist UNOCHA to overcome these problems (DFID, USAID and DG 
ECHO). Following this experience, in Lebanon, a total of 4% of funding of the 
conflict response was allocated to coordination mostly to UNOCHA and UNDP. At 
the same time, a deliberate effort was made to establish coordination with non-
traditional (Arabic) donors, which proved useful as they often did not have the 
movement constraints as the UN had. In DRC, assistance to the UN Humanitarian 
Coordinator in developing a common humanitarian strategy evolved into a single 
strategy on which DG ECHO and other donors base funding decisions.  
At the beginning of each financial exercise, DG ECHO establishes an indicative 
allocation of resources on the different "foreseeable" crises and an operational 
reserve of 15% of its budget that is used to respond to sudden disasters or to 
increased needs in a given context. For bigger crises, the Commission can also 
request to mobilise the emergency reserve. The entire € 50M provided in response to 
the conflict in Lebanon was drawn from this emergency reserve, avoiding the 
depletion of DG ECHO's operational reserve and a negative impact on other, less 
mediatised, crises. However, the repeated calls on the emergency fund over the last 
years emphasises the insufficiency of regular funds.  
2.9. Coordination and Complementarity at EU level  
Even though many initiatives take place to strengthen coordination, this is often 
based on good intentions and individuals more than it is on a systematic strategic 
approach. Country studies discuss coordination both at headquarters and at field level 
to ensure successful responses. 
Even though few formal mechanisms at local or international level exist, DG ECHO 
experts and EU Member States representatives have regular meetings on 
humanitarian coordination. For instance in the DRC, other humanitarian actors are 
included. However, such coordination is often depending on proactive staff who take 
an initiative in order to fill coordination gaps. In Lebanon, the EC Delegation was 
very instrumental in providing support to DG ECHO and MIC experts in terms of 
office space and coordination meetings, while in Pakistan: information was shared 
through daily situation reports sent to all EU Member States. Close cooperation 
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between the Commission and the European Parliament ensured early availability of 
funding from the Commission reserve. It is argued, following Pakistan's experience, 
that the earlier formal EU coordination at Headquarter level takes place, the better 
leverage can be given to funding (also in terms of visibility). This was in particular 
relevant to counter misinformation circulated to the media about the extent of donor 
response to the crisis. It would also have avoided misunderstandings that arose from 
selective high level coordination between UNOCHA and different EU actors. 
Coordination from the EU as a block, building on EC and DFID field presence, could 
have assisted the improvement of overall planning and co-ordination. For example, 
introducing earlier lateral thinking could have addressed shelter needs. In 
Burma/Myanmar, donors have set up a Partnership Group for the Effectiveness of 
Aid (Paris Declaration) in which the Commission plays an important role. Regular 
informal meetings with other donors (DFID, JAICA, KOICA, and AUSAID) take 
place. Coordination should benefit from the recent decision to give to the UN 
Resident Coordinator the responsibility of "Humanitarian Coordinator". 
2.10. Coordination with other EU Actors involved in humanitarian relief 
DG ECHO presence in the field is particularly helpful to facilitate coordination with 
other actors. Action at headquarters is needed to ensure clear mandates and 
application of relevant guidelines. Cooperation with other EU actors is good, but 
time consuming.  
With regard to the relationship between humanitarian aid and civil protection, 
clarification of the respective roles, expertise and mandates is discussed in the 
country studies. This clarification is needed based on the fact that presently more EU 
actors are working in the humanitarian aid field. The Presence of DG ECHO crisis 
teams in the field greatly helped such coordination with EU Member States, donors, 
UN and the team of civil protection experts (MIC) in Lebanon and Pakistan. Daily 
joint situation reports included Member States financial contributions (through the 14 
points' system) as well as in-kind donations (through MIC) and were useful. Between 
24 July and 18 August, the MIC sent three successive teams of civil protection 
experts to Lebanon. At the same time, DG ECHO needed to be more explicit to 
ensure that its mandate and the operations of EC humanitarian aid instruments were 
well understood by all parties. In Pakistan, two MIC-experts arrived and established 
contacts with the UK presidency. One remained as part of the UK (DFID) 
Humanitarian team. In the context of the Lebanon crisis, coordination at headquarters 
between EU military staff and the Commission ensured a consensus to apply MCDA 
guidelines and ensure adherence to the last resort principle. In addition to advocating 
the respect for the Oslo and for the MCDA guidelines at all opportunities, DG ECHO 
has contributed to the dissemination of the guidelines by funding the UN 
Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Field Handbook  
3. THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (1998-2007) 
3.1. Context 
The humanitarian situation in Congo has been severely affected by political 
developments since the early 1990s. The former Belgian colony had already suffered 
a considerable decline during the years of Mobutu. The consequences of the 
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Rwandan genocide in 1994 and the two so called 'Congo wars' have further worsened 
the humanitarian situation and eventually precipitated the change of regime. 
The arrival of some 1.2 million Rwandan refugees into Eastern Zaire in 1994 
exacerbated local ethnic tensions, which involved also Congolese populations of 
Rwandan origin. It also provided cover for troops of the former Rwandan regime to 
launch attacks into Rwanda. Judging Mobutu to be complicit with these attacks, the 
Rwandan Army supported a local rebel group under Laurent Désiré Kabila that 
overthrew Mobutu and took power in 1997, in what became known as the first 
Congo War. Zaire was then renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).  
The second Congo war erupted in 1998 when President Kabila expelled his Rwandan 
and Ugandan supporters, provoking a Rwandan and Ugandan backlash against him, 
their former ally. This prompted the intervention of troops from Angola, Chad, 
Namibia, Sudan, and Zimbabwe in support of the new rulers in Kinshasa. In August 
1999, the governments of DRC, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe 
and the main - but not all - Congolese opposition groups signed a ceasefire 
agreement in Lusaka. However, the fighting persisted. 
President Kabila was assassinated in January 2001 and his son, Joseph Kabila, was 
named Head of State. He began overtures to end the war once and for all. These 
resulted in the "Acte Global et Inclusif" signed in Pretoria in 2002, which provided 
for a 24-month transitional government, established in 2003, embracing some of the 
main protagonists from the civil war, including at vice-presidential level.  
In order to monitor the peace accords the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
established, in 1999, the United Nations Mission in Congo (MONUC). It now 
consists of approximately 17,000 troops and is the largest UN peacekeeping 
operation in the world. Over the years it has acquired a Chapter VII mandate in order 
to deal with the persistent armed opposition groups including Forces Démocratiques 
de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) / Interahamwe (Rwandans implicated in the 1994 
genocide who subsequently fled to eastern DRC), Mai-Mai factions (bands of local 
DRC citizens originally formed to resist Rwandan army occupation), and ethnic or 
clan-based organizations that continue to threaten security in certain areas.  
In Ituri, a separate ethnic conflict erupted in 2003. UNSC Resolution 1484 of 30 May 
2003authorised a Chapter VII intervention in Bunia, to which the EU responded by 
deploying a French-led Interim Emergency Multinational Force, known as 
"Operation Artemis", until MONUC reinforcements could take over in September of 
the same year. 
Events in DRC over the last decade have claimed an estimated 3.3 million lives as a 
direct result of fighting or indirectly because of disease and malnutrition. The 
conflict had a disproportionate effect on civilians who were subjected to massacres, 
looting, raping and the destruction of their villages and crops. It has displaced 3 to 4 
million residents, with up to 500,000 finding refuge in neighbouring countries. 
Especially in the East, it resulted in the collapse of the few remaining essential 
services, such as health and education, and it exhausted most of the coping 
mechanisms, livelihood and agricultural assets.  
 EN 10   EN 
3.2. Co-ordination and strengthening of the international humanitarian system 
Over the last three years, besides the European Commission, major donors have been 
the United States, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Canada, Japan, and Sweden2 
In the complex situation in DRC, DG ECHO saw the need to encourage co-
ordination and a coherent strategy in the various sectors. Thus, it funded the United 
Nations' Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Activities (UNOCHA) and 
encouraged them to deploy in the most affected zones.  
The international community has started to pilot a number of humanitarian reform 
initiatives in the DRC, including the cluster approach introduced by the UN 
Humanitarian Co-ordinator at the end of 2005, the Central Emergency Response 
Fund (CERF), the pooled fund established in 2006 by a group of bilateral donors and 
put at the disposal of the Humanitarian Co-ordinator, and the Needs Assessment 
Framework Matrix. DG ECHO is either directly or indirectly involved in most of 
these and whilst it is too early to assess the impact of these mechanisms, their main 
aims are to focus on better covering the needs of the beneficiaries and to define in a 
clear and simple way, and by consensus, objectives and indicators allowing for a 
better follow up and a more precise evaluation. 
Together with the other main donors, the UN and its implementing partners, DG 
ECHO has assisted the UN Humanitarian Co-ordinator in developing a common 
humanitarian strategy for DRC. From this has evolved the Humanitarian Action Plan 
for DRC, which outlines the needs and the technical and financial resources required 
to meet them. The main thrust of the plan is to provide emergency assistance to the 
newly displaced and to support those returning home. DG ECHO funds are provided 
in conformity with this common humanitarian strategy.  
EU Member States and the Delegation of the European Commission in Kinshasa 
hold regular meetings on political and development issues. Humanitarian co-
ordination meetings are held under the aegis of the GHD (donors only) and with the 
Humanitarian Action Group, in which UN agencies and major NGOs also 
participate. There is no formal specific mechanism, neither locally or elsewhere, for 
co-ordination and complementarity at EU level. Instead, ad hoc initiatives are often 
taken by DG ECHO experts and/or representatives of EU Member States in DRC.  
3.3. Specific response by the European Commission / DG ECHO  
The European Commission, through DG ECHO, has been present with humanitarian 
aid interventions in DRC since the exodus of refugees from Rwanda in 1994. Since 
the current crisis resulting from the 2nd Congo war in 1998, it has allocated more 
than € 315M, excluding ECHO flight, in humanitarian aid, which makes it the single 
largest humanitarian donor to the affected populations. 
Over this period of time, foreign aid has been the substantial source of survival for 
many Congolese people. It is estimated that well over USD 200 M/year of 
                                                 
2 Source: Financial Tracking System, compiled by OCHA on the basis of information provided by donors 
and appealing organisations. 
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humanitarian aid has been committed to the DRC. The 2006 Humanitarian Action 
Plan alone has so far attracted USD 290 M. 
The humanitarian aid community has paid a toll, facing constant threats, robberies, 
kidnappings, difficulties of access, and even deaths as in the case of six ICRC staff 
murdered in Ituri in 2001. A limited number of aid organizations have maintained a 
permanent presence in DRC and even these have found it difficult to attract and keep 
qualified international staff. Good local staff is also limited due to the lack of 
adequate educational opportunities.  
Over the last year, security and access to remaining vulnerable populations have 
improved considerably. This, together with decreasing mortality and malnutrition 
rates and the successful completion of the elections, bear witness to the progress 
made in DRC. However, this must be viewed in the context of DRC remaining 
amongst the most vulnerable and the least developed countries in the world, with 
some of the lowest human development indicators.  
Emergency responses are still required in the Eastern areas, where conflict and 
displacement of populations are still considerable. In Ituri, the Kivus and Katanga 
more than a million people are still displaced and even if most are now on the way 
home, they will need a wide range of assistance before they can become self- 
sufficient again. Also more than 300,000 refugees are still expected to return from 
neighbouring countries.  
In order to adapt its response to changing needs, DG ECHO's intervention strategy in 
DRC has been evolving through different phases:  
• In 1998 the focus was on assisting the population with short term life-saving 
programmes in the war zones, particularly in those rebel held areas in the east 
devoid of formal assistance. Humanitarian aid was provided as best as possible 
through the recruitment of partners in a few 'poles of assistance' where secure 
access could be achieved. 
• As security improved from 2002 onwards and certain areas, such as the former 
front line, became accessible, DG ECHO widened its area of operation. Gradually 
the former 'poles of assistance' became large confluent areas allowing more 
substantial and sophisticated programmes to be put in place. For instance, together 
with other stakeholders, DG ECHO was able to evolve a comprehensive health 
programme providing a standard package of services across the whole east of the 
country.  
• In 2002, DG ECHO provided a response to the humanitarian needs generated by 
the volcanic eruption in Goma.  
• The steady return of government control and development donors from 2003 into 
those areas where security had improved has allowed DG ECHO to hand over 
some of its programmes requiring longer term solutions. DG ECHO will 
concentrate its efforts in 2007 on the few remaining areas of conflict in the east 
and on the huge task of assisting the 1.5 million displaced and refugees to return 
home and re-secure their livelihoods. 
 EN 12   EN 
Since 1998, DG ECHO has issued nearly 400 grant agreements with some 40 
implementing partners (UN specialised agencies, International NGOs, and the Red 
Cross family), often operating in cooperation with local actors. While, as stated 
above, DG ECHO's intervention in DRC has evolved according to the situation, its 
height of support was in 2004. These were some of its achievements: 
• Support, on average, to 65 health zones per year, providing direct healthcare to an 
estimated 4 million beneficiaries/year; 
• Nutritional support to an average of 50,000 children/year; 
• Provision of food, seeds and tools to an average of 487,000 beneficiaries/year; 
• The rehabilitation of basic infrastructure, including 370 km of humanitarian 
access roads; 
• Specific treatment programmes for victims of sexual violence, (which DG ECHO 
was one of the first to support); 
• Support to protection activities. 
The annex provides the main funding and the details of these allocations, which 
include funds from the humanitarian aid budget lines as well as the European 
Development Fund (EDF). For 2007, there is also a proposed initial allocation under 
the food aid budget line.  
3.4. Partnership and professionalism 
Over the last three years, roughly 80% of DG ECHO funds have been used to fund 
interventions by NGOs, whereas specialised United Nations agencies and the ICRC 
accounted for some 18% and 2% respectively. 
The humanitarian impact of the second Congo war represented a challenge in terms 
of access for a major donor like the Commission, both in terms of security, as well as 
geography. The war and the savagery of the protagonists closed down humanitarian 
access to all but a few pockets. In the light of the experience following the 1994 
genocide in Rwanda, the affected population was reluctant to find refuge in camps, 
rather preferring to hide in the bush, thus adding to the difficulty faced by 
humanitarian operators to provide them with assistance. DG ECHO concentrated on 
the Eastern rebel areas where all forms of government and donor support ceased and 
coping mechanisms collapsed. DG ECHO supported a critical mass of partners 
providing different components of an integrated multi-sector assistance package to 
population groups identified as particularly vulnerable. A particular example is the 
case of the population of Ituri which since 1999 had been provided with medical 
assistance, water and sanitation, shelter and food aid, as well as nutrition services. 
Many of DG ECHO partners work with local NGOs and contribute to the capacity 
building and transfer of know-how to local staff, whenever this is possible given the 
conditions.  
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DG ECHO has also funded a humanitarian air service, ECHO flight, which since 
2006/07 is exclusively operating in DRC. The Budget for the ECHO Flight was € 7M 
in 2006 and it is proposed at € 7.5M for 2007. The ECHO Flight proved instrumental 
in overcoming some of the major difficulties linked to access. Free access to the 
ECHO Flight scheduled service is provided not only to humanitarian agencies funded 
by DG ECHO, but also to all those who are involved in humanitarian or post-
emergency development activities.  
DG ECHO maintains three offices in DRC (in Kinshasa, Goma and Bukavu), as well 
as a satellite office in Bunia, employing a total of five expatriate technical assistants, 
including one, based in Goma, in charge of ECHO flight.  
3.5. Relations between humanitarian and military actors  
'Operation Artemis' was an example of civil military co-operation. At the initiative of 
DG ECHO, a clear, albeit informal, liaison mechanism was established between the 
humanitarian community and the "Operation Artemis", in line with the Guidelines on 
Military, Civil and Defence Assets (MCDA), which allowed for the respective 
mandates and roles of humanitarian operators and military to be fully respected, 
including in terms of differentiated visual identity. In particular, the military engaged 
in "Operation Artemis" were not involved in any activity consisting in the direct 
delivery of humanitarian aid to the beneficiaries. They provided a valuable 
contribution by creating the conditions for the civilian population of Bunia, who had 
fled when heavy fighting broke out, to return to normal levels. Their presence also 
allowed humanitarian organisations to implement without major disruptions the 
enhanced strategy that DG ECHO had devised since October 2002 in order to 
maintain the provision of basic assistance to the civilian population affected by the 
conflict in Ituri. This strategy incorporated advocacy, regular ECHO Flight services 
to Bunia, pre-positioned emergency stocks, and establishing new partners on the 
periphery of the District. 
3.6. Disaster reduction and transitional contexts - Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and 
Development 
The process of handing over programmes and responsibilities to the Government and 
development actors as they became present, interested and capable started in 2003. 
Progress registered so far is encouraging in the health sector, which is a priority 
sector for both the EC development co-operation and the World Bank in DRC. For 
example, the EC development co-operation is taking over some of the health 
programmes previously funded by DG ECHO, as well as launching a € 65 M 
rehabilitation and economic revival programme in the East of DRC, where DG 
ECHO-funded activities have mostly taken place. Some sectors are easier to link than 
others, whilst some programmes were of a purely emergency nature and had no long 
term logic. 
DG ECHO also promoted a common strategy in key sectors like health, by funding 
implementing partners that provided a minimum package of curative and preventive 
care, as well as encouraging, whenever possible, the use of existing structures and 
personnel of the Ministry of Health. Such a strategy was developed following a DG 
ECHO-sponsored conference in Nairobi with the participation of representatives of 
the World Health Organisation and all DG ECHO partners involved in the health 
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sector. The fact that both governmental authorities and rebel groups accepted the 
strategy was instrumental in its eventual success.  
By December 2005, the country was sufficiently pacified to organise a constitutional 
referendum. The positive result allowed the first pluralistic and open elections in the 
DRC in 40 years to take place on 30 July 2006 without major incidents. The EC 
played a role in organising and supporting the election process through the EDF with 
€ 165M. On 29 October President Kabila won the second round over Vice-President 
Bemba and was sworn in on 6 December. In April 2006, the EU and UN also 
approved the deployment of a special EU military force (EUFOR) to provide extra 
security, principally in Kinshasa, during the elections.  
At the time of writing (March 2007) a Prime Minister has been nominated and is 
expected to submit shortly to the Parliament the list of Ministers for the proposed 
Government to be voted. At the same time, in the eastern part of the country there are 
resource rich areas that are still interspersed with irregular fighting forces and that 
remain out of effective State control. 
4. LEBANON (SUMMER 2006) 
4.1. Context 
The 35-day conflict that affected Lebanon in July-August 2006 caught the Lebanese 
as well as the international community by surprise. Although internal tensions had 
been ongoing following the assassination in February 2005 of former Prime Minister 
Hariri, the subsequent withdrawal of Syria from Lebanon and the international 
enquiry into the assassination, no one expected that a kidnapping by Hezbollah of 
two Israeli soldiers on 12 July would trigger a large scale conflict between Hezbollah 
and the Israeli army with a significant human toll. The conflict resulted in the death 
of 1,183 Lebanese and injury of 4,551. In Lebanon, the bombing of Beirut, the Bekaa 
valley and the South of the country caused the massive displacement of 915,752 
people, or a quarter of the country's total population3, mostly IDPs (about 700,000 
mostly hosted in families, with close to 130,000 sheltered in public buildings) with 
220,000 having fled to neighbouring countries, especially Syria.  
The crisis was rightly qualified as a “protection” crisis: besides the material 
humanitarian needs, the primary need of the victims was one of protection. The 
response capacity of humanitarian operators on the ground was largely conditioned 
by their capacity to deal with the “security factor”: UN agencies were both hindered 
by their own security requirements and helped by the existence of a civil-military 
coordination with the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) that allowed a number of convoys 
to go through; NGOs had the facility to operate in all parts of the country – except in 
the most affected areas bordering Israel - but were operating at “their own risk”: 
many of those funded by the Commission were already present in the country, 
working with the Palestinian refugees and having their partnerships with local 
organisations. ICRC was best positioned, as is often the case in such circumstances, 
mobilising a substantial team, making best use of its local partner (the Lebanese Red 
                                                 
3 According to the Government of Lebanon (GoL) Higher Relief Council (HRC).  
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Cross) whilst negotiating access with both parties to the conflict. For DG ECHO, all 
three types of partners brought a different added value thus confirming, once again, 
the advantage of working with a wide-range of partners.  
The Israeli attacks on Lebanon caused widespread damage to homes and civilian 
infrastructure, including 630 km of roads, 78 bridges, 32 vital points (airports, ports, 
water and sewage treatment plants, electrical plants, etc), 25 fuel stations, 72 over-
passes and 15,000 private houses and apartments, leading to the disruption of 
essential services. The conflict was coupled with an air and sea blockade on the 
country combined with a severe limitation on road movements inside the country as 
well as towards neighbouring Syria. These constituted an access challenge for the 
relief effort as well as a protection gap for the local population. In the most affected 
areas (South of the Litani river) the “choice” for the population was either to remain 
trapped in their villages, with the risk of being bombarded in their own houses or to 
wander towards the North or coastal towns, and risk being shelled on the road.  
The crisis was a high profile one, drawing a lot of media attention as well as political 
mobilisation from the international community. The latter was, however, either 
unable or unwilling to bring the conflict to a halt, or even to call unanimously for an 
immediate cease-fire, but finally intervened, following a Security Council resolution 
on 12 August.  
For the EU, the crisis was felt as “close to home”: about 200 kilometres separate 
Lebanon from Cyprus. Thousands of EU nationals were on holidays in the country 
and the events immediately prompted a major evacuation effort – by road to 
Damascus and by boat to Larnaca for onward transfer to their places of origin. 
Member States, the high representative for the CFSP as well as the Commission 
attempted, without much success, to broker a solution to the conflict.  
4.2. Coordination 
Coordination was a significant challenge in this crisis: many actors were involved, 
information from the areas most affected was scattered, access was difficult, and the 
UN were constrained by the security measures imposed (it was considered level 4) 
which restrained their movements. These pitfalls have been identified by OCHA 
itself in its lessons learned paper on the Lebanon crisis. UNOCHA actually arrived 
only a few days before the launch of the flash appeal and with three people on the 
ground was unable to engage in the level of coordination that was needed. In Beirut, 
the Commission (EC Delegation with the support of DG ECHO and MIC-experts) 
actually covered a real gap in coordination and information sharing on the 
humanitarian responses of each donor. The Commission went a step further by 
engaging with the non-traditional donors, Arab countries, who were extremely active 
in this crisis, and had no movement constraints. Similarly, the Commission 
coordinated with the national authorities, municipalities as well as local NGOs. On 
the funding side, 4% of the total Lebanon conflict response has been allocated to 
coordination (with €800,000 going to OCHA during the emergency phase, and € 1M 
to UNDP in the post-emergency phase). Internal Commission coordination was also 
a priority. Daily joint situation reports with the MIC-experts were produced and 
distributed within the EU institutions. In addition, the Commission produced several 
times a week information notes on the humanitarian situation and responses, which 
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encompassed Member States financial contributions (through the 14 point system) as 
well as in-kind donations (through the MIC).  
4.3. Specific response by the European Community: a two-staged financial response 
The need to mobilise humanitarian aid became apparent a few days after the 
beginning of the conflict. On 17 July, Commissioner Louis Michel announced an 
"earmarking" of € 5M which would be made available as soon as needs assessments 
could take place. As soon as the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis caused by the 
conflict became clear, two financial decisions totalling € 20M were adopted on 24 
and 26 July 2006, to address immediately the most urgent humanitarian needs in 
Lebanon – emergency medical supplies and equipment, water and sanitation, food, 
shelter, as well logistics (to support an operation made very complex by the effects of 
the blockade and the conflict situation) and in neighbouring countries (assistance to 
the refugees). This first allocation of funds allowed responding considerably to the 
ICRC appeal (€ 4M contribution to the preliminary appeal of 18 July for € 6.5M, 
later scaled up to € 64.6M on 27 July) and to the Consolidated Appeal of the UN (€ 
9.1M of the first two decisions were in favour of the UN, who adopted a $ 150M (€ 
119M) flash appeal on 24 July). 
The definition of the sectors of intervention (relief food and non food items, logistics, 
shelter, health, protection, logistics and coordination) was sufficiently broad to allow 
the necessary flexibility to adjust to the evolution of the situation of the ground 
which was completely unpredictable and part of the € 20M has actually covered 
humanitarian needs of the aftermath of the conflict. Eventually, the breakdown of the 
emergency response has been as follows: 42% on relief food and Non Food Items 
(NFI), 12% on shelter, 10% on Water and Sanitation (watsan), 9% on health, 8% on 
protection, 15% on logistics (through WFP) and 4% on coordination (through 
OCHA). In total, the two decisions funded 23 projects, the smallest was for €22,500 
for communication support through Telecom Sans Frontières, and the largest was for 
€ 4M through the ICRC. Partners covered all three categories: UN (6 partners, 
45.5%), Red Cross (1 partner, 20%) and NGOs (17 partners, 34.5%). 
The Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) 
On 21 July, the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) was activated upon a 
request from Cyprus to assist in the coordination of the evacuation effort as well as 
the channelling of in-kind assistance provided by eleven Member States to Lebanon, 
transiting through Cyprus. This was complemented by a MIC deployment to Beirut 
in the following days. The MIC sent three successive teams covering the period of 24 
July to 18 August to coordinate the provision of aid in kind from Member States' 
civil protection authorities and, in addition, several successive teams of marine 
pollution experts to deal with the consequences of the oil spill that affected the 
Lebanese coast. The expert teams were based in the EC Delegation premises in 
Beirut and contributed to the joint situation reports discussed above.  
4.4. Advocacy for the respect of IHL 
The humanitarian crisis that resulted from the conflict in Lebanon was clearly a 
"protection crisis". In the letter to the Israeli authorities, the EU clearly called on all 
parties to respect international humanitarian law, notably the protection of civilian 
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populations and the facilitation of access to the victims. This call was repeatedly 
made by the EU4. The political interest in the Lebanon crisis was deliberately used 
by the Commissioner for humanitarian aid to advocate for the respect of IHL in the 
West Bank and Gaza. On 22 July, Commissioner Michel and Minister Lehtomäki 
(Finish Presidency of the EU) wrote to the Israeli MFA and minister of defence5 
calling for respect for IHL and for safe entry into and exit out of Lebanon for land, 
sea and air-borne cargo and for safe passage within the country. Following Council 
meetings6 also made explicit reference to IHL. Advocacy was not just on security for 
humanitarian aid workers, but on the whole crisis as a protection concern, and on the 
respect of IHL. The letter of Commissioner Michel and of the Finish Presidency, 
mentioned above, was a concrete example of such advocacy efforts.  
4.5. Civil-military interface: relation between humanitarian and military actors 
The interface with the military played an important role in the Lebanon crisis in two 
respects: use of military assets in support of the humanitarian intervention, and 
liaison with one of the forces on the ground to guarantee access.  
Advocacy of MCDA guidelines  
The involvement of the (European) military in the crisis started with the evacuation 
of EU nationals (by military boat from Lebanon to Cyprus). The sea and air blockade 
made it difficult to access the country, even with clearance from the Israeli 
authorities, due to the damage inflicted on the airport. As a result, OCHA requested 
military assets for transport, which were provided by EU Member States (Portugal). 
During regular meetings between the Commission and the EU military staff of the 
Council, consensus emerged on the need to only use military assets if no civilian 
means were possible and to apply the MCDA guidelines. These meetings provided 
an opportunity to promote the principle that the military should intervene only in 
"last resort" and "in support of" the civilian humanitarian intervention.  
Liaison with the Israeli military over access and IHL 
The main obstacle to the humanitarian operation (and foremost concern) was access 
to the South (where about 200,000 persons were stranded) for humanitarian aid 
workers and access to the country as a whole for humanitarian goods. The message 
of Commissioner Michel and Minister Lehtomäki was reiterated during 
Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner's visit to Tel Aviv on 26 July and the offer of the 
Israeli authorities to liaise with the Commission on humanitarian access was taken up 
with the dispatching of a Technical Expert with a military background to act as a 
"liaison officer" with the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). The IDF had put in place a 
system of "concurrence" by which planned movements in Lebanon were 
communicated to them, and they either gave green light or not (for instance if 
military operations were foreseen) to these movements. The UN and the ICRC used 
                                                 
4 For example in the GAERC conclusions of 1st August 2006 which called the parties to "refrain from 
actions in violation of IHL" and referred to the similarly dramatic situation in Gaza and the West Bank. 
5 This was an initiative in support of the ICRC and of UNOCHA, as M. Egeland had written on 20 July 
to the Israeli MFA asking for safe passage and for the nomination of a focal point with which the 
humanitarian agency could liaise.  
6 For example in the GAERC of 1st August. 
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the system to ensure safety of their own movement, and in the case of the ICRC, that 
of the Lebanese Red Cross. The deployment of a liaison officer of DG ECHO was a 
first case for a donor, and proved to have a real added value in ensuring safe 
movement of staff in Lebanon and secure implementation of an EC funded operation. 
The Liaison Officer sensitised the IDF and the Israeli Centre for Coordination and 
Humanitarian Relief (CCHR) to the mandate of DG ECHO and to the needs and 
operational modalities of humanitarian agencies, especially NGOs.  
4.6. The post-emergency and recovery response: quick impact and LRRD. 
The 12 August cease-fire marked a turn in the crisis. The visit of Commissioner 
Michel to Lebanon and Israel from 14 to 17 August highlighted that the level of 
damage incurred, the loss of lives and livelihoods, the sheer numbers of potential 
returnees, as well as uncertainty as to how long the reconstruction effort would take 
to kick in, required a substantial additional humanitarian aid effort from the EU. An 
additional € 30M were estimated necessary to achieve this purpose.  
A financial decision was adopted on 19 October 2006, following a call on the 
emergency reserve of the EC, to respond to remaining humanitarian needs especially 
in the shelter-, water and sanitation- and health sector, as well as for UXO clearance, 
and to pave the way for a "return to normality" by supporting livelihood recovery 
interventions in favour of the vulnerable affected population. This decision is 
expected to be implemented by the end of 2007, thus allowing for about 15 months 
transition from emergency to development. The financial envelope allocated is 
considerable and aims at providing a substantial and rapid support to the victims of 
the conflict to limit the impact of the conflict by addressing remaining needs and by 
initiating a quick recovery that will be sustained by medium to long term 
interventions from other – development - sources of funding. The LRRD perspective 
is very present in the implementation of this last funding decision with the emphasis 
being on livelihood recovery (26%) and de-mining (22%), the other sectors being 
shelter rehabilitation (20%), water and sanitation (11%), health and psychosocial 
support (8%), relief food and NFIs (5%), protection (4%) and coordination (4%, 
through UNDP). The choice of the two largest sectors responds to LRRD priorities: 
livelihood recovery of individuals or small groups of individuals is a first step toward 
full socio-economic recovery of the country, a priority which is pursued by the EC 
funding to Lebanon for 2007-2010 whereas de-mining is both a life-saving activity 
and one which has to be pursued for a number of years (the EC has earmarked € 4M 
for de-mining for 2007-2010). The scope of partners covered by this third and last 
decision is the following: UN (€ 6M, with a substantial funding to UNDP); Red 
Cross (one national society, € 0.5M) and NGOs (€ 21M so far; 18 partners) as well 
as a specialised agency of a Member State (THW, € 0.5M). 
In total, when it comes to partnership, the response of DG ECHO has been 
implemented through the UN (7 partners); the Red Cross (2 partners); the NGOs (28 
partners) and specialised agencies (1 agency). Ultimately, the entire € 50M7 provided 
in response to the Lebanon conflict have been drawn from the emergency reserve. 
When the call on that reserve was made, a "replenishment" of the initial € 20M 
                                                 
7 The total of humanitarian aid for Lebanon in 2006 is 54 M€: 50 M in response to the conflict and about 
4 M€ previously allocated in support of the Palestinian refugees.  
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response was requested, and accepted by the budgetary authority, to avoid depleting 
DG ECHO's operational reserve and to avoid a negative impact on other, less 
mediatised crises.  
4.7. Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative 
With regard to the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative, the response to the 
Lebanon crisis is a good example of how GHD objectives, principles and best 
practices impregnate the humanitarian assistance provided by the Commission: 
• The intervention reiterated the basic values and principles of humanitarian aid: 
independence, neutrality, impartiality, and the corollary of advocacy for IHL, 
respect and promotion of the MCDA guidelines (objectives 1, 2, 3; general 
principle 4; good practices 17, 19, 20). 
• The operations that were funded were based on a continuous needs assessment. 
They provided an assistance package including basic relief needs, protection and 
livelihood recovery (objective 3) and in a way which is supportive of recovery and 
long term development (principles 5, 6, 9). By adopting timely emergency 
decisions, at the same time as the UN appeal was launched, and preceding them 
with a press statement of the Commissioner announcing upcoming funding, 
predictability was ensured but was combined with needs assessments (principle 6; 
good practice 12). A balance was found in the response to the appeals of the UN 
(45.5% of the emergency response), the ICRC (20%) and NGOs (34.5%) and 
support was provided to the coordination role of the UN (principle 10; Good 
practices 14). 
• The intervention in Lebanon was met with a considerable funding response. The 
Commission deliberately strived to ensure that this would not be detrimental to 
needs in ongoing crises by requesting that the full humanitarian assistance 
package to Lebanon be met from the emergency reserve (good practice 11).  
4.8. Direct aid and partnership: deployment of a team to Beirut  
From the first day of the crisis, DG ECHO was on alert to follow up the evolution of 
the situation to determine whether a humanitarian aid intervention was needed and 
with what level of funding. The monitoring was done from DG ECHO’s Regional 
Support Office in Amman, as was, in the following weeks, the backstopping for the 
operation.  
DG ECHO’s intervention was facilitated by its prior presence in Lebanon, for the 
past ten years, in support of the Palestinian refugees. The location in Amman of a 
DG ECHO expert who knew Lebanon very well and could be dispatched to Beirut as 
soon as the situation appeared to become protracted, and the presence of DG ECHO 
funded partners, notably in the South of the country, were instrumental both 
immediately gathering information on the evolution of the situation on the ground 
and being ready to respond to humanitarian needs in a timely manner. The DG 
ECHO intervention could also benefit from the full support of the EC Delegation in 
Beirut. On 20 July, the expert responsible for Lebanon opened a provisional office in 
the Delegation office and immediately started holding coordination meetings with 
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the ICRC, UN Agencies and NGOs, as well as carried out – whenever access 
allowed it - assessment missions in the country.  
The team in Beirut was strengthened from 24-30 July with the deployment of the 
Head of Unit responsible for the Middle East, notably to put in place the coordination 
with the first of the MIC teams who also arrived in Beirut on 24 July8. The team was 
further consolidated with DG ECHO experts detached from other regions (Asia and 
Africa) for the duration of the acute phase of the crisis and regular support with 
experts and local staff deployed from Amman. The presence of a full DG ECHO 
crisis team in Beirut allowed to fulfil various tasks at the same time: conducting 
needs assessments and monitoring aid delivery which, due to security constraints and 
to the damage of the road network, were time-consuming; ensuring coordination with 
local authorities, with the team of civil protection experts (MIC), EU Member States, 
other donors, the UN and other humanitarian agencies; and reporting back to 
headquarters. The end to fighting of 14 August following the Security Council 
resolution of 12 August calling for a “full cessation of hostilities” did not end the 
suffering of the Lebanese population. The return of IDPs as well as continuing to 
cover humanitarian needs until a return to normality was likely to require more 
financial support from DG ECHO than the emergency phase itself. Hence the 
decision to open an DG ECHO office in Beirut and the recruitment of two experts 
was taken. The “permanent” team of experts for Lebanon arrived at the beginning of 
September.  
5. PAKISTAN (2005 -2006 )  
5.1. Context  
On Saturday morning 8 October 2005, at 3:52 GMT, an earthquake with its epicentre 
located 95 km north east of Islamabad in Pakistan, measuring 7.6 on the Richter 
scale created a major humanitarian crisis in both Pakistan and Indian administered 
Kashmir. It was followed by well over 1,700 aftershocks and major landslides 
especially during the monsoons in July/August 2006. A general overview of the 
impact was apparent after the first week, but a full picture took several weeks. The 
main humanitarian impact was in Pakistan where estimates were: over 73,000 dead, 
over 69,000 injured and an estimated 3 million 'homeless' defined as having damaged 
dwellings, with more than 600,000 houses estimated partly or totally damaged, and 
150,000 internally displaced (IDPs) assisted in formal displaced camps. In Indian-
administered Kashmir, estimates were of over 1,300 dead, 6,622 injured and 160,000 
homeless.  
Overall, the response involved a wide range of actors including the Pakistan and 
Indian governments, military and civil society, international aid agencies, and 
NATO, with the international response largely focused on Pakistan where the bulk of 
the needs were. While the international response was significant and very necessary 
given the scale of the needs, especially in Pakistan, the major part of the relief effort 
was covered by the governments and people of Pakistan and India. The main needs 
                                                 
8 Several successive teams of the MIC went to Lebanon, first to coordinate the Member States provision 
of in-kind assistance and second, to deal with the oil spill that affected the Lebanese shores from the 
beginning of August. 
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identified were for shelter/domestic items, medical assistance, water and sanitation, 
and food. The main challenges for the humanitarian response were the scale of the 
needs and the logistics difficulties of access with much of the affected population in 
mountainous terrain at the feet of the Himalayas with winter looming. 
5.2. Coordination and strengthening of the international humanitarian system: the 
cluster approach 
Overall coordination with the Government of Pakistan - through its specially created 
instrument, the Federal Relief Commission (FRC) - of the international response was 
led by UNDP, with UNOCHA for the humanitarian coordination component, but 
applied through the new 'cluster' approach. Planned for introduction in 2006, this 
approach was applied prematurely to the earthquake with the result that many 
agencies – including those involved as cluster leads - had to learn about and develop 
the new approach at the same time as managing their emergency responses. The 
approach involved different UN agencies leading different 'clusters' in Islamabad and 
several 'hubs' in the earthquake affected areas. Results were mixed, with problems 
such as delays of up to weeks in having a field presence for all cluster leads in all 
hubs, and initial confusion over the leadership of the key 'shelter' cluster. There were 
problems of communication between the field hubs and Islamabad based 
coordination leading to misinformation about the real state of the response to the 
needs and challenges faced. As part of broader close coordination with the other 
donors with substantial field presence, DFID and USAID, DG ECHO worked to 
assist UNOCHA in overcoming this. Such Islamabad level co-ordination was 
reinforced through DG ECHO participation in high level meetings and 
teleconferences with other key actors. 
5.3. Specific response by the European Community  
As of 7:30 GMT on the morning of the earthquake, the Crisis Cell of the European 
Commission's Humanitarian Aid department was up and running, following the 
situation and making necessary contacts with DG ECHO field offices in Pakistan, 
Afghanistan and the Regional Office in New Delhi, as well as DG ECHO partners in 
the affected area. In India, a DG ECHO team was already present in the affected area 
at the time of the earthquake, and was quickly reinforced. Within days of the 
earthquake the DG ECHO field office in Pakistan had been reinforced, and two 
mobile teams established in the earthquake affected area reporting back on needs and 
advising on partner presence and performance for the allocation of funding, as well 
as on real levels of coordination, to ensure the quality of the response. This 
information was shared through daily situation reports sent to all EU Member States 
during the emergency phase, and subsequently on a weekly basis. 
The first partner aid agencies operational on the ground were notably Télécom Sans 
Frontières, Médecins Sans Frontières (who had a field team present in Peshawar 
following DG ECHO funding for the Afghan refugees), Aga Khan Foundation, 
Oxfam, and the Red Cross/Crescent. A diversity of emergency response agencies 
with global reach, and area specific niche agencies. 
Overall DG ECHO allocated € 49.6M, (which has up until now for almost 100 % 
been contracted); with € 13.6M of this within a week of the earthquake, and € 48.6M 
in just over two months. The remaining € 1M was allocated for the 2006-7 winter. 
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Also within two months DG RELEX had allocated € 50M for rehabilitation 
assistance and early recovery in Pakistan, ensuring funding in place for LRRD. Some 
of this funding came from the overall Commission reserve, which was made 
available with unprecedented speed notably due to the close cooperation between the 
Commission and the European Parliament. 
The Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) 
The Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) immediately established contact with 
the UK Presidency to assess the situation. The Community Civil Protection 
Mechanism was formally activated on Sunday 9 October at 9.15 GMT following an 
official appeal for international assistance by the Government of Pakistan (GoP). 
Two coordinators for MIC arrived within the first few days for over a week, with one 
then remaining but as part of the UK (DFID) humanitarian team. 
23 out of the 30 countries participating in the Mechanism offered assistance in the 
form of food, blankets, medicine, medical teams, search and rescue and other experts 
/ supplies. A number of European search and rescue teams were deployed as part of 
the relief operation. Some of the items donated were highly specialised, for example, 
the Finnish government donated 1000 special 'winter tents', each fitted with a wood-
burning stove and providing heated accommodation for 15 persons; i.e. 15,000 
persons in total. These were procured by the Finnish Ministry of Interior from the 
Finnish Ministry of Defence.  
5.4. Sectoral interventions 
In response to the needs, immediately following the earthquake and through the 
winter, the first phase assistance was predominantly in the sectors of health and 
shelter/domestic items, with significant water and sanitation and some food. In 
coordination with the cluster approach, DG ECHO worked with partners to guide 
coherent sector approaches focused on the rapid delivery of results in core needs 
areas. DG ECHO, through its role as an engaged donor, worked to spread best 
practice and innovative approaches – thus from early on partners were encouraged to 
address shelter needs not just with tents, given the delays in securing supplies, but 
with kits of basic materials such as corrugated iron sheeting. This sectoral assistance 
also included guideline documents prepared by DG ECHO with its partners, such as 
for water and sanitation, as well as DG ECHO assisted international reference 
standards such as Sphere. 
Before the winter, population displacements from the high altitude areas had largely 
contributed to there being 150,000 IDPs accommodated in formal camps - with the 
real figure for IDPs being much higher because any group of displaced of 50 or less 
were classified as informal IDPs and not included in the overall figure. With the 
onset of winter, constraints on access increased, and populations remaining exposed 
and isolated during the winter became the major humanitarian priority, in particular 
to consolidate their temporary shelter. This was reflected in the GoP/IOM9 'Race 
Against Winter' plan of 31st October. Subsequently, as needs evolved after the 
winter, the health sector remained important while shelter diminished as emergency 
                                                 
9 International Organisation for Migration 
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needs were met and first phase livelihood support and water and sanitation became 
more important. Disaster reduction and mitigation was mainstreamed into the DG 
ECHO funded response10. This final phase of operations continues until April 2007. 
This is to allow the time necessary to achieve results such as harvest yields from 
seeds and tools projects, and completion of water supply systems. It also ensured the 
monitoring of humanitarian needs, and the presence of humanitarian agencies able to 
contain outbreaks of humanitarian need: e.g. those displaced during post-earthquake 
landslides, especially in the monsoon season; and most notably through the DG 
ECHO funded WHO Disease Early Warning System, which included guiding rapid 
responses to contain outbreaks of water borne diseases such as cholera during the 
summer and monsoon season. 
5.5. Access and civil / military cooperation  
Access was a major challenge given the mountainous terrain of much of the affected 
area, and helicopters were an urgent priority. This need was addressed immediately 
through Pakistani military helicopters, and by aid agencies already present such as 
the Aga Khan Foundation (with immediate DG ECHO funding). At the same time, 
with the urgency and scale of the needs exceeding available civilian capacity, 
additional helicopters were provided by NATO. In addition, WFP rapidly established 
UNHAS (United Nations Humanitarian Air Service), with DG ECHO as one of the 
donors. This civil-military logistics air operation was coordinated with the 
Government of Pakistan by the UN. The air operations extended the delivery of relief 
assistance to areas inaccessible by road, and enabled rapid overall needs assessment. 
Most of the relief items and personnel were transported by road. DG ECHO funded 
Atlas Logistics to rationalise the airport clearance and land transport for many aid 
agency partners, with consequent improvements in effectiveness of cost-efficiency of 
aid delivery.  
5.6. Disaster reduction and LRRD transitional contexts 
The GoP declared April 1st, 2006 as the beginning of the rehabilitation phase, and 
replaced the FRC with ERRA (Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation 
Authority). With this LRRD introduction of the rehabilitation phase and phasing 
down of the relief phase, the Commission (DG ECHO - in coordination with DG 
RELEX and DG AIDCO), DFID, Austria (EU Presidency) and UNOCHA - 
organised and hosted a meeting in Brussels on March 16th. The first part was an EU 
Member States co-ordination meeting to review the remaining humanitarian needs to 
be met, the funds available amongst EU agencies to meet these needs, and the 
problems that remained to be addressed. The second part pursued these issues with 
an expanded meeting to include GoP, UN, Red Cross and INGOs, with presentations 
from GoP and UNOCHA. 
                                                 
10 To provide adequate knowledge and information material on seismic safety to local governments, 
communities and schools in order to increase awareness on disaster risk reduction and enable the 
population, especially women, to take disaster risk reduction strategies in earthquake recovery and 
rebuilding. 
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5.7. Partnership and professionalism 
Reflecting pre-crisis preparedness, the DG ECHO field team included staff that had 
undergone the UNDAC11 training designed to enhance coordination between UN and 
other agencies during the vital first phase of emergency response. Further, in addition 
to direct operational funding in response to the crisis, a number of UN agencies were 
already receiving DG ECHO thematic funding to improve their capacity to respond 
to just such a crisis. This was notably the case with UNOCHA, and WHO who 
performed well in this crisis. Finally, amongst DG ECHO funded partners, the Red 
Cross/Crescent proved particularly rapid in the first phase response, along with some 
specialised international agencies, through field hospitals and water supply units 
specially designed for rapid deployment in such crises. 
Beyond the challenges of ensuring access, there were capacity challenges for the 
international relief effort. While, despite some reports in the media, implementation 
was generally not limited by the availability of funding, there were other constraints. 
From the outset, agencies struggled with a need for sufficient experienced 
international aid staff in a year of major humanitarian disasters such as the Tsunami 
and Darfur; there were few local NGOs as partners with good local knowledge for 
the international agencies and these few were development oriented; there were 
supply shortages of key relief items such as winterised tents. DG ECHO's own 
capacity to process funding to partners while ensuring quality of delivery came under 
strain a month after the crisis when major funding requests from the UN agencies 
began to arrive, notably from UNOCHA and individual cluster lead agencies.  
In terms of security, from this second relief phase and into the recovery phase a 
series of security incidents began with hostility from certain political/religious 
sectors of local society manifested towards the aid workers; this despite the needs 
based and non-partisan focus of the relief effort in line with humanitarian principles. 
The most widespread such tension related to the 'Danish cartoons' issue.  
The overall EU response to the earthquake was for € 235M by the time of the March 
2006 conference and transition phase, with 48 % of this provided through UK 
(DFID) (at 28 %) and the Community (at 20 %) alone, and a further 41 % 
contributed by 7 other Member States. The UN appeal – which included the Red 
Cross/Crescent and INGOs together with UN agencies - was 66% funded which is 
average for such appeals. The recorded EU response12 to the appeal amounted to 25 
% of the funds requested, or 38 % of the funds received. 
In addition to specific project evaluations and field audits during the response, DG 
ECHO is now conducting evaluations of key sectors of the response, and has 
commissioned an independent evaluation of its overall response programme – which 
will include analysis of to what extent different aid agency partners implemented the 
funds contracted to them. The results of these evaluations will provide information 
on the nature and costs of responses in such situations in the future in order to ensure 
the quality and cost-effectiveness of responses. 
                                                 
11 United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination 
12 This is undoubtedly an underestimate given that the UNOCHA recorded figure is for $139 M, while the 
EU 14 point' system of contributions shows over € 235 M allocated.  
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6. BURMA/MYANMAR 
6.1. Context 
Burma/Myanmar, with a population of around 52 million inhabitants, is one of the 
least developed countries in the world. Since its independence in 1948 and the 
military coup in 1962, the country has known many internal conflicts, including 
governmental forces fighting against communist insurrections, ethnic violence and 
the militias of drug lords.  
Ethnic violence, violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms are constant 
factors of the political landscape. In the early 1990s, the country's self-imposed 
isolation was cautiously eased and some market-oriented economic reforms were 
implemented. For the military government (State Peace and Development Council, 
SPDC), the cease-fire agreements with ethnic armies in the 1980s and 1990s were 
the beginning of a long state building exercise. The 'Roadmap for constitutional and 
political reform' of 2003 promised a transition to a civilian government. A 
Constitution is expected by 2007. The National League for Democracy (NLD) and its 
leader Aung San Suu Kyi – winner of the 1990 elections and 1991 laureate of the 
Nobel Peace Prize – are marginalised. Reports indicate that there might be around 
1,100 political prisoners in the country. 
Burma/Myanmar is one of the poorest Asian countries, being 129th out of 177 
countries according to the 2005 Human Development Index. In recent years, the 
humanitarian situation has deteriorated especially in the border regions. The health 
situation is particularly worrying and WHO, in its 2005 World Health Report, shows 
that public expenses in the health sector per inhabitant in Burma/Myanmar are the 
third lowest in the world (after DRC and Burundi). Some humanitarian indicators 
like the under 5 mortality rate (106 out of 1,000 newly-born) are three times higher 
than in neighbouring Thailand. Main causes of premature death in Burma/Myanmar 
are malaria, HIV/AIDS, acute respiratory infections and diarrhoeic diseases. 
International NGOs involved in anti-malaria campaigns in 2005 estimate 2.5 millions 
cases annually. The situation is particularly serious in Rakhine State, where only a 
quarter of the population has access to primary health care. Food insecurity and 
malnutrition also affect these populations (31% suffer from acute malnutrition). The 
absence of potable water and the lack of hygiene are main causes of water-borne 
diseases and count for half of the morbidity. 57% of the population does not have 
access to sanitary installations (according to UNDP), and 40% does not even have 
access to potable water. 
The protection of the population is a serious problem. Reports from international 
human rights organisations (Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch) indicate 
that "massive violations" including forced labour, forced displacement and arbitrary 
taxation are commonplace. In border areas where conflicts occur between the army 
of the Myanmar Union and opposition groups, the civil population is particularly 
exposed to these violations. In Rakhine State, 800,000 Muslims are deprived of the 
Myanmar nationality and suffer from discriminatory practices varying from forced 
labour to extortion of money, limitation of freedom of movements and land 
confiscation. In the East and South-East, low intensity armed resistance continues. 
Forced relocations of villages have led in recent years to an outflow of refugees into 
Thailand (in September 2006, around 152,000 refugees were sheltered in nine camps 
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in Thailand and 30,000 in Bangladesh). The estimated number of internally displaced 
people is 500,000. The insurgent Karen National Union (KNU) have not agreed with 
the government on a cease-fire agreement. The repatriation of refugees from 
Thailand back to Myanmar is therefore not likely in the near future. Most refugees 
have orientated their hopes on resettlement in third countries. Meanwhile, the support 
to the refugees remains essential for their survival. 
6.2. Access: the humanitarian space still threatened  
Access to areas of continued insurgency, like Kayin State or Thanintaryi Division, is 
either difficult or dangerous (landmines) or prohibited by the authorities. This makes 
implementation of humanitarian aid difficult All humanitarian organisations have to 
obtain a travel permit when undertaking visits to projects outside Yangon. In 2006, 
new regulations imposed increased controls on humanitarian organisations (for 
example travel by expatriates require the presence of a government representative) 
and make access to projects more difficult for international staff. A survey led by the 
DG ECHO office in Yangon with partner organisations concluded that procedures 
delayed access to target areas. This led to the suspension of two operations in 2005. 
DG ECHO will maintain in 2007 its policy to ask for the presence of expatriate staff 
on the site of supported projects in order to better monitor the project, support and 
protect local staff employed in these projects. 
6.3. Coordination and complementarity at EU level and the strengthening of the 
international humanitarian system 
Four EU Member States have an embassy in Yangon (FR, UK, DE, IT). Only the UK 
has an ongoing humanitarian programme with a team in the field (intervening in the 
health sector with € 9.5M in 2006). Given the small amount of humanitarian aid, 
field-level coordination is relatively easy but remains insufficient: a monthly inter-
NGO coordination meeting is limited to an exchange of information without a more 
operational sectoral coordination. The cluster approach has not yet been applied in 
Burma/Myanmar. This should change in 2007 following a decision (November 2006) 
by the UNSG to give the UN Resident Coordinator the responsibility as 
Humanitarian Coordinator. This would stimulate coordination with a better support 
from OCHA (with a regional office in Bangkok). In January 2007, donors set up a 
partnership group for aid effectiveness (Paris Declaration). The aim of this 
partnership is to come to a common understanding of the needs and problems and to 
increase aid effectiveness. The Commission will fund an assessment or mapping 
exercise of who is doing what and where in Burma/Myanmar. The Commission plays 
role in this group, through the participation of the Delegation in Bangkok and the DG 
ECHO office in Yangon. This office regularly participates at informal meetings with 
other donors (DFID, JAICA, KOICA, and AUSAID) present in Burma/Myanmar. It 
also participates in meetings of representatives of Member States. In February 2006, 
authorities adopted new rules to coordinate humanitarian aid, which have been 
applied to some extent during, without modifying existing practice (monthly reports 
to local authorities, regular contacts with them to manage movements of local and 
expatriate staff). 
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6.4. Specific response by the European Community  
Burma/Myanmar receives very low levels of international aid: € 2 per inhabitant in 
2004 (compared to € 28 for Cambodia and € 40 for Laos). In many regions, the 
minimum services offered by humanitarian organisations are the only basic facilities 
for the population.  
The EU approach towards Burma/Myanmar is defined by the EU Common Position. 
Adopted for the first time in 1996, it confirmed the already existing restrictive 
measures: an arms embargo imposed in 1990; the suspension of defence cooperation 
since 1991 and conditions on assistance. All EU programmes and projects have to be 
implemented by UN agencies, NGOs and through decentralised cooperation with 
local civil administrations. The Commission’s Country Strategy Paper for 2007-2013 
identifies health and education as focal sectors. The current EC commitment totals € 
20-25 million. The HIV/Aids programme has been expanded through a “3-Diseases 
Fund”, as a reaction to the withdrawal of the Global Fund for Aids, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria from the country (EC contribution: € 18 million for 2007-2010). Active EU-
MS donors are UK, NL, DE and SE.  
In all its programmes, the Commission endeavours to promote human rights, good 
governance, and civil society. 
GSP (Generalised System of Preference) privileges were withdrawn in 1997 because 
of forced labour issues. The visa ban and asset freeze concern the senior military, and 
members of government and their families. EU registered companies are prohibited 
from making finance available to named State-owned enterprises. The Common 
Position refers to dialogue with the regime (“… engage with the government over its 
responsibility to make greater efforts to attain the UN Millennium Development 
Goals”). 
Since 1994, DG ECHO has financed humanitarian projects aiming at helping the 
most vulnerable populations in Burma/Myanmar and the 150,000 Burmese refugees 
living in camps on the other side of the frontier in Thailand (The first camps in 
Thailand for refugees from Burma/Myanmar were established in 1984). In response 
to the humanitarian situation, DG ECHO has increased its financial allocation for 
these populations, from € 6.5M in 2001 to € 15.5M in 2006, this last financing 
covering the year 200713. In order to ensure a better follow-up of operations, DG 
ECHO opened an office in Yangon in October 2005. 
In Burma/Myanmar, 22% of DG ECHO's financing is used for basic health care in 
remote areas, notably in favour of populations without citizenship in Rhakine State. 
Water and sanitation activities represent 20% of financing and are an important 
component of DG ECHO interventions in the South-East. The remainder is allocated 
to nutrition programmes, food aid and protection. DG ECHO supports in particular 
the ICRC and its mandate aiming at the respect of IHL and UNHCR notably for its 
protection activities. At the Thai border, programmes financed cover food (allocation 
of € 6M in 2007) and sanitation (€ 3.4M) for refugees living in camps. 
                                                 
13 See annex for overview of funding decisions. 
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Over the last years, the humanitarian aid of the Commission has developed specific 
mechanisms that integrate the problem of forgotten crises as part of its intervention 
policy and tools have been refined, resulting in the forgotten crisis assessment. This 
has benefited the humanitarian aid funds allocation for Burma/Myanmar.  
Even in a politically delicate situation like Burma/Myanmar, the Commission still 
tries to contribute to the development of guidelines. Thus, in January 2007, a group 
of donors, including the Commission, was set up in order to give a practical 
translation of principles of aid effectiveness following in particular the Paris 
Declaration. 
6.5. Upholding the humanitarian principles  
Since 1996 and as a consequence of the human rights situation and the lack of 
transition towards a civilian, legitimate government the EU has adopted a "Common 
Position" as described above. It is not possible for the Member States and the 
Commission to support development programmes, with the notable exception of 
projects and programmes aiming at promoting human rights and democracy, good 
governance, conflict prevention and reinforcement of civil society capacities. Other 
exceptions include health and education programmes, programmes implemented by 
UN agencies, NGOs or by decentralised cooperation at the level of local civil 
administrations. 
Humanitarian aid is an area not affected by the restrictions imposed by the Common 
Position. Since 2000 Burma/Myanmar has been considered in the Commission's 
humanitarian strategy as part of the "forgotten" or "neglected" crises (six crises 
selected by DG ECHO in 200714. In this respect, the most vulnerable population of 
this country (minorities without legal status, refugees, IDPs) has received aid worth 
more than € 100M since the creation of DG ECHO. DG ECHO opened an office in 
October 2005. By clearly separating humanitarian aid from the political aspects of 
the Common Position, the Myanmar example can be seen as the EU's recognition of 
the principles and specificity of humanitarian aid. 
6.6. Advocating International Humanitarian Law 
The promotion of International Human Rights and IHL is a challenge that the 
international community faces every day. A significant example is the difficulty for 
the ICRC to have its mandate respected by the authorities. Since December 2005, the 
ICRC is no longer allowed to visit prisons according to their principles, of 
interviewers' confidentiality. In October 2006, the junta demanded the organisation 
to close their field offices. The EU responded by a firm political declaration by the 
Presidency asking the authorities to reverse their decision. At the same time, at the 
humanitarian level a decision was adopted to continue the financial support to the 
ICRC efforts in Burma/Myanmar.  
                                                 
14 These are, besides Burma/Myanmar, the Sahrawi refugees in Algeria; Chechnya and the neighbouring 
republics affected; the separatist conflict in Jammu and Kashmir; Nepal with the persisting crises of the 
Bhutanese refugees as well as the Maoist insurrection; the populations affected by the crisis in 
Colombia and neighbouring countries.  
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DG ECHO's funding allows the UNHCR to implement its programmes of integration 
of the "Rohingyas" community – a stateless population of 800,000 in Rakhine State. 
Besides finance, this support enables the UNHCR to continue its dialogue with the 
Burmese authorities in order to convince them to give a status to this oppressed 
minority.  
6.7. Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative 
Humanitarian GHD principles recommend that the financing of a response to a new 
crisis shall not be to the detriment of existing crises. At a European level, no 
agreement exists on allocating sufficient and regular funds to forgotten crises. 
However, DG ECHO has made the support to this kind of crises a principle of annual 
programming. Burma/Myanmar has for several years been regarded as a forgotten 
crisis requiring a sustainable intervention according to the evaluation criteria set by 
DG ECHO. This strategic commitment has created a significant increase of financial 
support which has risen from € 1M in 2000 to € 6.4M in 2006. Between 2000 and 
2006, the Commission has financed 68 humanitarian operations for a total amount of 
almost € 33M. For Burma/Myanmar, the tools used by DG ECHO have made a vital 
difference for areas not subject to large media coverage. Especially the rural 
population, which creates little mediatisation because of the difficulties for (foreign) 
reporters to travel freely has benefited. The sanctions policy which disallows public 
development aid to Burma/Myanmar results in low ODA-levels emphasizing the 
nature of a forgotten crisis. In addition, the military government's grip on the media 
and internet as well as a restrictive visa policy are other elements turning the crisis 
into a 'forgotten' one.  
6.8. Partnership and professionalism 
The Commission works with the three "families" as each of them brings an added-
value very appreciated in the Burmese context. NGOs have flexibility which allows 
them to quickly adapt themselves to a moving bureaucratic context. UN agencies can 
coordinate the humanitarian response and take charge of problems linked to the 
protection of persons. The ICRC tries to ensure a high-level dialogue about IHL 
respect in conflict areas. DG ECHO's humanitarian policy benefits from assets 
brought by each of these partners. Although the network of local NGOs is embryonic 
for understandable reasons, potential exists to reinforce capacities of some local 
NGOs through partnership relations with international organisations supported by the 
Commission. For example, this year DG ECHO supports a water and sanitation 
project in Shan State partly implemented by a local NGO. This kind of initiative is of 
particular importance in the framework of authoritarian and centralized governments. 
6.9. LRRD 
The Common Position of the EU towards Burma/Myanmar has considerably limited 
the implementation of the concept of linking relief, rehabilitation and development. It 
is useful to recall that until 2006, this country has not benefited from strategically 
planned financial envelopes. The first Country Strategy Paper and Multi-annual 
Indicative Programme have been adopted only in 2007, without formal consultations 
with the authorities. They foresee an annual envelope of € 8M The instrument mainly 
used by DG RELEX (prior to the CSP/MIP) was the budget line "Aid-to-Uprooted-
People in Asia" Consequently, investments in terms of rehabilitation and 
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development projects remained modest (€ 6M in 2005). In these circumstances, DG 
ECHO and DG RELEX/AIDCO have tried to develop complementarities. An 
example is the financing of a food security programme which completes and exceeds 
the ambitions of a nutritional programme financed by DG ECHO in Rakhine State. 
These complementarities have recently been recognised by an evaluation of 
Commission action in North Rakhine. These last years, Community humanitarian aid 
has been in support of organisations which have developed programmes against 
malaria. The implementation of the new funds should enable this aid to concentrate 
on other objectives in the near future. 
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ANNEX 1: KEY DATES 
DRC 
Year Chronology 
April 1994 
Genocide of Tutsis in Rwanda. Following Tutsi led counter offensive, 1.2 million 
refugees, mainly Hutus, cross border with Zaire. Another million flee to Burundi and 
Tanzania. 
1995 
Ex-FAR (Hutu) launch attacks into Rwanda from camps in Zaire. Ethnic clashes 
occur in Eastern Zaire. 
1996 
Revolt of Zairian Tutsis “Banyamulenge” in South Kivu; ADFL’s (Alliance of 
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire) “Liberation” war led by 
Laurent-Désiré Kabila and supported by Rwanda begins from East (1st Congolese 
War). Most Refugees return to Rwanda but some flee into interior of DRC. 200,000 
are estimated to perish. 
28 May 1997 
Laurent-Désiré Kabila proclaims himself President of Zaire and renames the country 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). 
1998 
Congolese rebel forces, backed by Rwanda and Uganda, start attacking Kabila’s 
forces and conquer the east of the country. Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe come to 
Kabila’s aid and push the rebels back from Kinshasa. (2nd Congolese War). 
10 July 1999 
Ceasefire is signed in Lusaka, Zambia, between the six countries involved in the 
conflict: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Rwanda 
and Uganda. But the ceasefire is widely disregarded and so fighting and massacres 
continue. 
24 February 2000 
UNSC Resolution 1291 approves deployment, under Chapter VII of the UN Chart, of 
5,537 peacekeepers to monitor implementation of ceasefire (MONUC). Beginning 
2007, MONUC maintains 16,475 troops with a budget exceeding one billion dollars. 
It is the largest and most expensive mission in Department of Peace Keeping 
Operations (DPKO). 
2000 Six-day war between Rwanda and Uganda in Kisangani. 
January 2001 President Kabila shot dead by one bodyguard; his son Joseph takes over. 
March 2001 
MONUC deploys its first contingent to the east, first in rebel-held areas, and then in 
government-controlled zone. 
2002 Eruption of volcano Nyiragongo in Goma. 
2002 
Accord signed between Presidents Kabila and Kagame of Rwanda committing 
Rwandan to withdraw its troops from DRC and Kinshasa to address Rwanda’s 
security concerns. 
October 2002 
End of withdrawal of Angolan, Namibian and Zimbabwean troops, allied to DRC 
government. Rwandan forces also withdraw but Uganda forces only partially. 
1 April 2003 
In Sun City, South Africa, DRC government and rebel groups unanimously endorse a 
transitional constitution to govern DRC for two years, as well as global agreement 
signed in Pretoria on 17/12/02. Transitional government named by Kabila on June 
30. 
30 May 2003 
UNSC Resolution 1484 agrees to creation of an emergency international force to 
secure Bunia, regional capital of Ituri. Codenamed Artemis, the force, deployed by 
the European Union under French command, is composed of 1850 troops from 9 
countries, mainly France. The operation begins on 6 June 2003 and ends on 1 
September 2003. 
December 2003 Army reform and Demobilisation programme launched 
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May 2004 
Fighting breaks out in the eastern town of Bukavu, between soldiers loyal to 
Kinshasa and renegade soldiers of a former Rwandan-backed rebel group. 
October 2004 
Expert panel on Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth 
in DRC accuses Rwandan government of supporting Congolese dissidents. 
International Criminal Court and DRC sign an accord allowing the prosecutor to 
begin investigations into war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in DRC. 
January 2005 
The Lancet publishes IRC Mortality Study: 38,000 people die every month as a result 
of war. 
June 2005 
EU sends EUSEC mission providing advice and assistance to Congolese authorities 
in charge of security while ensuring promotion of policies compatible with human 
rights and international humanitarian law, democratic standards, principles of good 
public management, transparency and observance of rule of law. 
December 2005 
Congolese voters approve new constitution providing for a decentralized political 
system, limiting the president to two five-year terms, and guaranteeing women half 
the seats in government. 
February 2006 
The UN and the European Commission present in Brussels an ambitious 
Humanitarian Plan of Action asking for US$ 681 M for DRC. 
March 2006 
Warlord Thomas Lubanga, accused of forcing children into active combat, becomes 
first war crimes suspect to face charges at International Criminal Court in The Hague. 
April 2006 
UNSC's Resolution 1671 authorises temporary deployment of EU force to support 
MONUC during period encompassing elections. In the framework of the European 
Security and Defence Policy, EU launches Operation EUFOR RD Congo, conducted 
in full agreement with authorities of DRC and in close co-ordination with them and 
MONUC, and successfully concluded on 30/11/06. 
July 2006 
Presidential and parliamentary polls are held, first free elections in four decades. 
With no clear winner in the presidential vote, incumbent leader Joseph Kabila and 
opposition candidate Jean-Pierre Bemba prepare to contest a run-off poll on 29 
October. Forces loyal to the two candidates clash in the capital. 
November 2006 
Joseph Kabila is declared winner of October's run-off presidential election in polls 
that have general approval of international monitors, He takes oath as president on 6 
December. 
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Lebanon 
Year Chronology 
February 2005 
Internal tensions following the assassination of former Prime Minister Hariri, 
subsequent withdrawal of Syria from Lebanon and international enquiry into the 
assassination. 
12 July 2006 Kidnapping by Hezbollah of two Israeli soldiers. 
July 2006 Beginning of Lebanon conflict. 
17 July 
Commissioner Louis Michel announced an "earmarking" of € 5M which would be 
made available as soon as needs assessments could take place. 
18 July Preliminary appeal from ICRC. 
20 July 
DG ECHO's expert responsible for Lebanon opened a provisional office in the 
Delegation office and immediately started holding coordination meetings with the 
ICRC, UN Agencies and NGOs, as well as carried out –whenever access allowed it- 
assessment missions in the country. 
21 July 
the MIC was activated upon a request from Cyprus to assist in the coordination of the 
evacuation effort as well as the channelling of in-kind assistance to Lebanon, 
transiting through Cyprus. This was complemented by a MIC deployment to Beirut in 
the following days. 
24 July Flash appeal from UN. 
24 July Arrival of the MIC team in Beirut. 
24 and 26 July 2006 
Two financial decisions totalling for € 20 M were adopted to address immediately the 
most urgent humanitarian needs in Lebanon. 
26 July Visit of Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner to Tel Aviv 
12 August 
United Nations Security Council resolution 1701 calling for end to hostilities 
between Hezbollah and Israel. 
14 August End of fighting 
14 to 17 August Visit of Commissioner Louis Michel to Lebanon and Israel. 
19 October 
Financial decision following a call on the emergency reserve of the EC, to respond to 
remaining humanitarian needs. 
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Pakistan Earthquake 
Year Chronology 
8th October 2005 Earthquake. DG ECHO considers financing response actions.  
9
th
 October 2005 
Community Civil Protection Mechanism formally activated at 9.15 GMT following 
an official appeal for international assistance by the Government of Pakistan. 
10th October 2005 DG ECHO allocates € 3.6M in primary emergency assistance.  
11th October 2005 UN Flash appeal for $ 312M 
14th October 2005 DG ECHO allocates a further € 10M 
21st October 2005 
High level teleconference: UNOCHA + DFID, DG ECHO, Japan, NATO, UNDP, 
USAID. 
26th October 2005 
Geneva Donors Conference launches revised UN flash appeal for $ 551 M for UN 
agencies and INGOs to cover the ten clusters during immediate relief and the 
recovery phases. 
31st October 2005 Race Against Winter Plan 
2nd November 2005 UN funding proposals to DG ECHO for € 2.9 M received to date 
3rd November 2005 High level teleconference UNOCHA + DFID, DG ECHO, NATO, USAID. 
4th November 2005 
Letter from EC Commissioner Michel to UNOCHA USG Jan Egeland expressing 
concern at the lack of UN funding proposals received, given Mr Egeland's complaints 
to the media at lack of funding for the UN relief effort (against a background of 
UNOCHA requests to increase the CERF). 
18th November 2005 18th : DG ECHO allocates a further € 10M, bringing the total to date to € 23.6M 
18th/19
th
 November 
2005 
Conference Islamabad for Pledges for Rehabilitation funding following 3 week 
World Bank led rapid assessment mission. An estimated $5.8 billion needed, with 
$6.2 billion pledged. EC (DG RELEX) pledges € 50M. 
November 
Subsequently during November, € 25M of proposals were received from UN 
agencies. 
16th December 2005 DG ECHO allocates 25M EUR, bringing total funding to date to € 48.6M 
16th March 2006 
Total EU humanitarian response to earthquake to date € 235M. DG ECHO hosts 
conference 
1st April 2006 
Rehabilitation phase begins, as ERRA replaces Federal Relief Commission as GoP 
instrument to coordinate earthquake response. All international aid agencies required 
to submit their projects, ongoing and planned. A number of humanitarian projects 
had to be re-scheduled to accommodate the delays arising from this process. 
May 2006 
ERRA/UN Early recovery Plan launched for the transition from humanitarian to 
rehabilitation. 
July/august 2006 
Heavy monsoon rains lead to major landslides, blocking roads and displacing 
populations. Up to 6,000 are estimated to have been displaced by aftershocks and 
landslides subsequent to the earthquake. 
November 2006 
WFP launches new helicopter operation to ensure access over winter to the many still 
vulnerable in highland areas. 
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Burma/Myanmar 
Year Chronology 
1962 Military coup d'Etat led by General Ne Win  
1988 
Thousands of demonstrators for democracy killed. The army creates the SLORC 
(State Law and Order Restoration Council) and adopts an earlier name for the 
country: "Myanmar". Aung San Suu Kyi, daughter of the national hero, founds the 
National League for Democracy (NLD),but is put under house arrest the following 
year. 
1990 
Elections organised by the military junta. The NLD wins 82% of the seats. The 
SLORC does not recognise the results. A national coalition government (NCGUB) is 
formed outside the country by the democratic forces. 
1991 Aung San Suu Kyi is laureate for the Peace Nobel Price. 
1991-1992 
Around 250,000 Muslims flee from Rakhine State to Bangladesh following 
persecutions. 
1994 
Following an agreement between the authorities and the UNHCR,around 237,000 
persons return from Bangladesh between 1994 and 2005. 
1995 Aung San Suu Kyi released  
1996 
Fall of the Karen resistance's general headquarters at Manerplaw. Decisive 
weakening of anti-government forces EU formalises existing restrictive measures 
under the EU Common Position.  
1997 
Burma/Myanmar is admitted in the Associations of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). SLORC renamed SPDC (State Peace and Development Council). 
2001 
Beginning of a dialogue between Aung San Suu Kyi and the junta. More than 200 
political prisoners released. 
May 2003 
Assault against ASSK's motorcade during her visit to Depayin (Sagaing District). 
Junta announces her 'security detention' (house arrest) in September 2003. 
USA announce full economic boycott.  
September 2004 
Gentlemen agreement between Major General Khin Nyunt and the KNU leading to a 
temporary cease-fire. 
November 2004 The conflict starts again between the Burmese army and the KNU. 
August 2005 
The Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, withdraws from the 
country under US political pressure following restrictions on the implementation of 
their projects. 
November 2005 
The authorities start the process of transferring their administrative services from 
Yangon to the new capital Naypyidaw. 
December 2005 
Prisons visits by ICRC called into question by non-respect of interviews' 
confidentiality. 
February 2006 
Authorities produce directives for international humanitarian organisations 
concerning the implementation of humanitarian and development programmes. 
March 2006 MSF-FR decides to withdraw from Myanmar 
April 2006 
Conflict increases with the KNU leading to the displacement of 11,000 persons. In 
2007, the number of displaced persons is estimated to more than 500,000 and there is 
over a 150,000 Burmese refugees in camps in Thailand. 
May 2006 
The proposition of the "Three-disease fund" to fight Tuberculosis, Malaria and 
HIV/AIDS is accepted. 
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August 2006 
The UN Security Council decides against 4 opposition votes from China, Russia, 
DRC and Qatar to put Burma/Myanmar on the agenda. 
January 2007 
China and Russia veto an US motion for a UN Security Council resolution regarding 
the situation in Burma/Myanmar and its effects on peace and regional security. 
February 2007 
Division inside the KNU following the peace agreement signed between the 7th 
Brigade of KNLA (Karen National Liberation Army) and the Burmese army, 
agreement rejected by KNU.) 
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ANNEX II: FUNDING DECISIONS  
Below gives an overview of the funding decisions per crises (as of 19.3.2007), not 
including disaster preparedness, evaluation and thematic funding). It also gives an 
indicative distribution per sector as well as an overview of partners based on 
contracts.  
6.10. DRC  
Decisions  
Year Decision code  Decision  EUR 
1998 ECHO/TPS/210/1998/01000 Emergency Assistance, fight against the epidemic of 
cholera in the region of Eastern, Southern Africa and 
the Horn of Africa. 
187.500 
1998 ECHO/TPS/210/1998/02000 Humanitarian Aid for the population affected by the 
crisis in the Great Lakes Region. 
7.065.000 
1998 ECHO/ZAR/254/1998/01000 Emergency assistance in the context of the crisis in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo. Support to 
hospitals, nutritional program, emergency assistance 
to hospitals, health facilities. 
942.000 
1999 ECHO/TPS/254/1999/03000 Emergency humanitarian assistance to vulnerable 
populations. 
6.662.000 
1999 ECHO/TPS/254/1999/04000 Emergency food aid to vulnerable populations. 6.666.667 
2000 ECHO/ZAR/210/2000/01000 Global Plan 2000 for DRC. 20.000.000 
2001 ECHO/COD/210/2001/01000 Intervention plan 2001 35.000.000 
2002 ECHO/COD/210/2002/01000 Global Plan 2002 - Humanitarian Aid to the 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
32.000.000 
2002 ECHO/COD/254/2002/01000 Humanitarian Aid for the Angolan refugees in the 
Bas-Congo provinces. 
1.100.000 
2002 ECHO/TPS/210/2002/03000 Emergency aid for the population of Goma and 
environs affected by the eruption of the Nyiragongo 
volcano on 17 January 2002 
2.500.000 
2003 ECHO/COD/210/2003/01000 Humanitarian aid to vulnerable population groups in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) - Global 
Plan 2003 
35.000.000 
2003 ECHO/COD/210/2003/02000 Integrated assistance to displaced persons, refugees 
and host communities 
5.000.000 
2003 ECHO/COD/EDF/2003/01000 Assistance to displaced and other vulnerable groups 
in northern and eastern DRC 
4.000.000 
2003 ECHO/TPS/210/2003/11000 Support to UNOCHA in Respect to Information 
Dissemination, Strategic and Operational Co-
ordination. 
109.091 
2004 ECHO/COD/BUD/2004/01000 HUMANITARIAN AID to vulnerable population 
groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)  
GLOBAL PLAN 2004 
40.000.000 
2005 ECHO/-CF/BUD/2005/01000 Assistance for the repatriation and reintegration of 
Congolese refugees (DRC) 
1.000.000 
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2005 ECHO/COD/BUD/2005/01000 Global Plan 2005 38.000.000 
2006 ECHO/COD/BUD/2006/01000 HUMANITARIAN AID for Vulnerable population 
groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
38.000.000 
2006 ECHO/COD/EDF/2006/01000 Assistance to vulnerable populations in south eastern 
Congo. 
5.000.000 
2006 ECHO/FLI/BUD/2006/01000 Continuation of humanitarian air service (ECHO-
Flight) 
7.000.000 
2007 ECHO/COD/BUD/2007/01000 Humanitarian Aid for vulnerable population groups 
in the DRC 
30.000.000 
      315.232.258 
 
Sectors 
Health
44%
Food / Nutrition
21%
Logistics / 
Transport
2%
Wat / San 
16%
General / 
Miscellaneous
15%
Shelter
1%
Rehabilitation
1%
 
Partners 
ACF; ACTED; ALISEI, AMI; ASF; ATLAS; AVSI; CAFOD; CARE; CARITAS; 
CESVI; Children's Aid Direct; Concern; COOPI; Red Cross; CRS; Johanniter; FAO; 
FOMETRO; German Agro Action; Goal; Handicap; ICRC; IMC, IOM, IRC, MAG, 
Malteser Hilfsdienst; MDM; Medair; Memisa; Merlin; MSF; NRC; NOVIB; Oxfam; 
PMU Interlife; Premiere Urgence; PSF; StC; Solidarites; Tear fund; UNHCR; 
UNICEF; WFP; WHO; World Vision.  
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6.11. Lebanon 
Decisions  
Year Decision code  Decision  EUR 
2006 ECHO/-ME/BUD/2006/02000 Emergency humanitarian aid for the 
populations affected by the conflict in 
Lebanon 
2.500.000 
2006 ECHO/-ME/BUD/2006/03000 Humanitarian aid for the populations affected 
by the conflict in Lebanon 
10.000.000 
2006 ECHO/LBN/BUD/2006/01000 Emergency humanitarian aid for the 
population of Lebanon affected by the conflict 
10.000.000 
2006 ECHO/-ME/BUD/2006/02000 Emergency humanitarian aid for the 
populations affected by the conflict in 
Lebanon 
2.500.000 
2006 ECHO/-ME/BUD/2006/03000 Humanitarian aid for the populations affected 
by the conflict in Lebanon 
10.000.000 
2006 ECHO/-ME/BUD/2006/02000 Emergency humanitarian aid for the 
populations affected by the conflict in 
Lebanon 
2.500.000 
2006 ECHO/-ME/BUD/2006/03000 Humanitarian aid for the populations affected 
by the conflict in Lebanon 
10.000.000 
2006 ECHO/-ME/BUD/2006/02000 Emergency humanitarian aid for the 
populations affected by the conflict in 
Lebanon 
2.500.000 
      50.000.000 
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Sectors 
Coordination 
4%
Health/psychosocial 
8%
Logistics 
6%
Protection 
6%
Relief food & NFI
21%Shelter 
17%
Watsan
10%
Demining
13%
Livelihood Rehab
15%
 
Partners 
DRC, MPDL, CARITAS, Premiere Urgence, Handicap, Terre des Hommes, ICRC, 
UNHCR, WHO, World Vision, WFP, UNOCHA, CISP, ICU, THW, ADU, EMDH, 
MPDL, NRC, Danchurch Aid, FSD, MAG, UNDP, AVSI, Mercy Corps Scotland, 
ICU, Islamic Relief, WA, MDM, UNRWA, Care, TSF, Oxfam, ACted. 
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6.12. Pakistan 
Decisions 
Year Decision code  Decision  EUR 
2005 ECHO/-SA/BUD/2005/05000 Primary Emergency aid to the victims of the earthquake of 
8 October 2005 in South Asia 
3.000.000 
2005 ECHO/-SA/BUD/2005/06000 Emergency assistance to the victims of the earthquake of 8 
October 2005 in South Asia 
10.000.000 
2005 ECHO/-SA/BUD/2005/07000 Humanitarian assistance to the victims of the earthquake of 
8 October 2005 in Pakistan and India 
25.000.000 
2005 ECHO/PAK/BUD/2005/01000 Emergency assistance to the victims of the earthquake of 8 
October 2005 in Pakistan 
10.000.000 
2006 ECHO/PAK/BUD/2006/01000 Humanitarian assistance to the victims of the 8 October 
2005 earthquake in Pakistan 
1.000.000 
2005 ECHO/-AS/BUD/2005/05000* Humanitarian Aid for victims of the Afghanistan crisis and 
natural hazard in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran 
600.000 
   * Decision of 9.209.000, part committed for the earthquake 49.600.000 
Sectors 
General / 
Miscellaneous
16%
Shelter
24%
Wat/San
13%
Health
22%
Logistics/transport
11%
Food
14%
 
Partners 
Actionaid, Oxfam, TSF, STC, IFRC, Red Cross, Aga Khan, WFP, Medair, NRC, 
Atlas, UNOCHA, Handicap, UNFPA, Merlin, Hilfswerk, Malteser, FAO, ICRC, 
Premiere Urgence, ACH, Diakonie, Solidarites, Mercy Corps Scotland, German 
Agro Action, WHO, UNHCR, IOM 
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6.13. Burma/Myanmar 
Decisions 
Year Decision code  Decision  EUR 
1992     207.472 
1994 ECHO/BA-/B7-510/94/0100   240.000 
1995 ECHO/TH-/B7-217/95/0100   1.520.000 
1995 ECHO/TH-/B7-217/95/0200   800.000 
1996 ECHO/BA-/B7-210/96/0100 Assistance to vulnerable groups in Rakhine State Myanmar 300.000 
1996 ECHO/TH-/B7-217/96/0100 Humanitarian emergency aid for Karens refugees coming 
from Myanmar 
700.000 
1996 ECHO/TH-/B7-217/96/0200 Humanitarian emergency aid for Mons refugees, coming 
from Myanmar, in Thailand 
220.000 
1996 ECHO/TH-/B7-217/96/0300 Humanitarian emergency aid for Karens refugees coming 
from Myanmar 
500.000 
1996 ECHO/TH-/B7-217/96/0400 Humanitarian aid for Karens and Mons refugees coming 
from Myanmar. 
2.000.000 
1996 ECHO/TPS/B7-210/96/0600 Food Aid for refugees and DPs taken in charge by UNHCR 
in different countries. 
500.000 
1997 ECHO/BA-/B7-210/97/0100 Humanitarian assistance for the Rohingas and vulnerable 
population of Rakhine State 
675.000 
1997 ECHO/TH-/B7-217/97/0100 Humanitarian aid for Karen population coming from 
Myanmar 
780.000 
1997 ECHO/TH-/B7-217/97/0200 Humanitarian aid for population coming from Myanmar 
refugee in Thailand. 
2.000.000 
1997 ECHO/TH-/B7-217/97/0300 Humanitarian aid for population coming from Myanmar 
refugee in Thailand. 
470.000 
1998 ECHO/MMR/210/1998/01000 Humanitarian aid for the population affected by floods in 
Myanmar. 
500.000 
1998 ECHO/MMR/210/1998/02000 Humanitarian assistance for the displaced population in 
Rangoon and in the Rakhine State. 
695.000 
1998 ECHO/THA/217/1998/01000 Humanitarian aid in favour of the refugees along the Thai-
Burmese border. 
1.390.000 
1998 ECHO/THA/217/1998/02000 Humanitarian aid in favour of the refugees along the Thai-
Burmese border. 
800.000 
1998 ECHO/THA/217/1998/03000 Humanitarian aid in favour of Burmese refugees along the 
Thai-Burmese border. 
1.755.000 
1998 ECHO/THA/217/1998/04000 Humanitarian aid in favour of refugees (coming from 
Burma) living in camps along the Thai-Burmese border. 
699.000 
1999 ECHO/MMR/210/1999/01000 Humanitarian aid in favour of the weakest population in 
Burma. 
1.000.000 
1999 ECHO/THA/217/1999/01000 Humanitarian aid global plan in favour of Burmese refugees 
living in camps in Thailand. 
4.500.000 
2000 ECHO/MMR/210/2000/01000 Humanitarian aid in favour of the most disadvantaged 
population in Burma. 
1.000.000 
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2000 ECHO/THA/210/2000/01000 Humanitarian aid in favour of Burmese refugees living in 
camps. 
4.500.000 
2001 ECHO/MMR/210/2001/01000 Humanitarian aid for vulnerable ethnic minorities in 
Burma/Myanmar 
2.000.000 
2001 ECHO/THA/210/2001/01000 Humanitarian aid in favour of Burmese refugees living in 
camps along the Thai-Burmese border. 
4.500.000 
2002 ECHO/MMR/210/2002/01000 Humanitarian aid for the people of Burma/Myanmar 2.000.000 
2002 ECHO/MMR/210/2002/02000 Humanitarian aid for the people of Burma/Myanmar 1.500.000 
2002 ECHO/THA/210/2002/01000 Humanitarian aid for Burmese refugees living in camps at 
the Thai-Burmese border 
1.200.000 
2002 ECHO/THA/210/2002/02000 Humanitarian aid for the Burmese Refugees in Thailand 2.000.000 
2002 ECHO/THA/210/2002/03000 Emergency aid in favour of Burmese refugees living in 
camps in Thailand and affected by floods in September 
2002. 
200.000 
2002 ECHO/THA/210/2002/04000 Humanitarian aid in favour of Burmese refugees living in 
camps along the Thai-Burmese border. 
1.565.000 
2002 ECHO/THA/210/2002/05000 Humanitarian aid for the Burmese refugees living in the 
camps of Thailand 
500.000 
2003 ECHO/MMR/210/2003/01000 Myanmar 3.320.000 
2003 ECHO/MMR/210/2003/02000 MYANMAR/BURMA 2.000.000 
2003 ECHO/THA/210/2003/01000 Thailand 4.450.000 
2003 ECHO/THA/210/2003/02000 Humanitarian aid in favour of Burmese refugees living in 
camps along the Thai-Burmese border. 
1.790.000 
2004 ECHO/-AS/BUD/2004/02000 Humanitarian assistance to vulnerable population in 
Myanmar and to refugees along the Myanmar-Thai border 
11.650.000 
2004 ECHO/-AS/BUD/2004/03000 Emergency assistance to the victims of the earthquake and 
resulting tidal waves in Asia 
428.571 
2004 ECHO/MMR/BUD/2004/01000 Humanitarian aid in favour of the vulnerable population of 
Myanmar 
3.420.000 
2004 ECHO/THA/BUD/2004/01000 Humanitarian assistance to the Burmese refugees living in 
the camps along the Thai/Burmese border 
4.650.000 
2005 ECHO/MMR/BUD/2005/01000 Humanitarian assistance to vulnerable population in 
Myanmar 
1.500.000 
2005 ECHO/-XA/BUD/2005/01000 Humanitarian assistance to vulnerable population in 
Myanmar and to Burmese refugees along the Myanmar-Thai 
border. 
15.000.000 
2006 ECHO/MMR/BUD/2006/01000 Humanitarian assistance in favour of the vulnerable 
populations of Northern Rakhine State in Myanmar/Burma 
200.000 
2006 ECHO/-XA/BUD/2006/01000 Humanitarian assistance to the vulnerable populations in 
Myanmar and to Burmese refugees along the Thai-Myanmar 
border. 
15.500.000 
      107.125.043 
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Sectors
Health
36%
Food
43%
Others
11%
Wat/San
10%
 
Partners 
AMI, ICCO, Malteser Hilfsdienst, MSF, UNHCR, Handicap, ADPC, IRC, Mekong 
River Commission, World Vision, AF, UNICEF, STC, ACF, ICRC, Care, Terre des 
Hommes, CESVI, UNHCR, EMDH, Merlin, WFP, German Agro Action. 
